The High Cost of Pragmatism: How the Philippines' West Philippine Sea Deal May Undermine International Law

Article by James Salazar

Published on March 12, 2026 6:56 PM

The Department of Foreign Affairs' July 2024 "provisional understanding" with China on rotation and resupply missions to Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Shoal) has been presented as a pragmatic way to ease tensions ¹, but the arrangement carries significant risks that could undermine the Philippines' legal position and weaken the practical force of international law. ²

A Deal Built on Legal Ambiguity

The 2016 Arbitral Award confirmed that China's nine-dash line has no legal basis and cannot generate maritime entitlements beyond those allowed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Ayungin Shoal lies approximately 105 nautical miles west of Palawan's archipelagic baseline, firmly within the Philippines' 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, meaning there is no legally recognized overlap between Philippine and Chinese EEZs in these waters. ³

Yet the "provisional understanding" appears to treat the area as if competing claims exist. UNCLOS Articles 74(3) and 83(3) encourage states to adopt "provisional arrangements of a practical nature," but only for areas where maritime boundaries remain undelimited and overlapping entitlements actually exist. By creating a bilateral mechanism where international law recognizes no dispute, the arrangement risks implicitly legitimizing China's expansive nine-dash line narrative. ⁴

Malaysia and Vietnam provide instructive contrasts. Despite facing sustained Chinese presence near their offshore energy activities, neither country has formalized provisional operational arrangements that appear to give China a role in their EEZ activities or mechanisms that could be interpreted as recognizing the legitimacy of the nine-dash line. Vietnam and China have concluded publicly documented cooperative mechanisms only in areas of genuine overlapping claims, such as fisheries arrangements in the Gulf of Tonkin, where UNCLOS explicitly encourages practical arrangements pending boundary settlement. ⁵

The Problem of Secrecy

Compounding these legal concerns is that the text of the arrangement remains undisclosed, raising fundamental questions about what exactly was agreed and what concessions the Philippines made to stop China's obstruction of RoRe missions. Secrecy may provide short-term diplomatic flexibility, but it creates long-term instability and allows Beijing to renege on commitments or resume coercion with limited consequence. ⁶

Already, the DFA and China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs have issued differing public interpretations of the agreement. China's Foreign Ministry stated Beijing was willing to allow resupply operations "if the Philippines informs China in advance and after onsite verification is conducted," while it monitors the entire resupply process. The DFA countered that the spokesperson's statement "regarding prior notification and on-site confirmation is inaccurate". ⁷

If Manila did not agree to prior notification, what concessions did Philippine diplomats make that were sufficient to prompt Chinese forces to stop obstructing legitimate Filipino operations? The inability to make details public raises concerns that Philippine interests may have been compromised, echoing the controversial Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking during the Arroyo administration. ⁸

Rewarding Coercion and Setting Dangerous Precedents

The most significant concern is the precedent of rewarding coercion. China's sustained coercive operations, dangerous maneuvers, water-cannoning, ramming and obstruction of navigation, created the conditions that led to a deal that sidelined UNCLOS and the Arbitral Award. The lesson for Beijing is clear -- coercion produces concessions. ⁹

Already, based on data from the Philippine Coast Guard, Chinese vessels and coercive maneuvers have intensified around Escoda Shoal (Sabina Shoal), another low-tide elevation within the Philippine EEZ, suggesting not de-escalation but displacement of coercive pressure. On August 25, 2024, China mounted the first major obstruction to Philippine government vessels around Escoda Shoal, when the BFAR vessel BRP Datu Sanday, conducting a humanitarian mission to provide diesel and food to Filipino fishermen, was surrounded and rammed by eight Chinese vessels. ¹⁰

The following day, China deployed roughly 40 vessels to block a humanitarian mission delivering food, water and medical supplies to the personnel of BRP Teresa Magbanua. Like at Ayungin Shoal, China has no legitimate claim over Escoda Shoal, yet the escalation emerged weeks after the DFA announced its "provisional understanding," suggesting the agreement may have simply redirected Chinese coercive activities rather than reduced them. ¹¹

The Provisional Understanding Factor

When the Philippines accepts arrangements that treat China as having operational or legal standing in areas within the Philippine EEZ, it risks contributing to the normalization of Beijing's nine-dash line narrative. Even without formal recognition, repeated accommodation may gradually shift perceptions about what constitutes "disputed" waters, an outcome China seeks.

DFA is now shepherding negotiations for a Code of Conduct that could have far more consequential implications for Philippine sovereignty and maritime rights. DFA's approach to the Ayungin Shoal arrangement suggests a willingness to accommodate unlawful claims already rejected by a binding international tribunal, raising concerns about how DFA will handle the even more complex Code of Conduct negotiations. ¹²

The Path Forward

Reducing tensions is a legitimate diplomatic objective, but pragmatism should not come at the expense of long-term national interests. Any arrangement that blurs UNCLOS and the outcome of the 2016 Arbitral Award risks diluting their practical force over time. Instead of advancing the rule of law at sea and defending Philippine maritime rights and interests, the July 2024 arrangement appears to have accommodated an unlawful claim already rejected by a binding international tribunal. ¹³

By treating Ayungin Shoals as requiring bilateral arrangements, even if described as an "understanding," the deal risks implicitly acknowledging the existence of a dispute where international law says none exists. The Philippines must ensure that future negotiations, particularly the Code of Conduct, are transparent, grounded in UNCLOS principles, and do not reward coercion or create precedents that could be exploited elsewhere in the West Philippine Sea.

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Notes:

¹ Strangio, S. (2023) China, Philippines reach ‘provisional’ deal over disputed shoal. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/china-philippines-reach-provisional-deal-over-disputed-shoal/ (Accessed: 01 March 2026).

² Ordaniel, J. (2026) China’s RoRe deal: Rewarding coercion, setting a dangerous precedent. Available at: https://globalnation.inquirer.net/310987/chinas-rore-deal-rewarding-coercion-setting-a-dangerous-precedent (Accessed: 02 March 2026).

³ Santos, M. (2016) Key points of arbitral tribunal’s verdict on PH-china dispute | global news, INQUIRER. Available at: https://globalnation.inquirer.net/140947/key-points-arbitral-tribunal-decision-verdict-award-philippines-china-maritime-dispute-unclos-arbitration-spratly-islands-scarborough (Accessed: 06 March 2026).

⁴ Yiallourides, C. (2019) Rights and obligations of states pending resolution of overlapping claims, Ebrary. Available at: https://ebrary.net/209038/law/rights_obligations_states_pending_resolution_overlapping_claims (Accessed: 02 March 2026).

⁵ Ordaniel, J. (2026) China’s RoRe deal: Rewarding coercion, setting a dangerous precedent.

⁶ RFA and BenarNews (2024) Second Thomas shoal: Deal or no deal?, Radio Free Asia. Available at: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/southchinasea/china-philippines-second-thomas-shoal-07222024043003.html (Accessed: 06 March 2026).

⁷ Strangio, S. (2023) China, Philippines reach ‘provisional’ deal over disputed shoal.

⁸ Ordaniel, J. (2026) China’s RoRe deal: Rewarding coercion, setting a dangerous precedent.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Laqui, I. (2024) China Coast Guard Vessels ram BFAR ship headed to escoda shoal, Philstar.com. Available at: https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2024/08/25/2380489/china-coast-guard-vessels-ram-bfar-ship-headed-escoda-shoal (Accessed: 02 March 2026).

¹¹ Ordaniel, J. (2026) China’s RoRe deal: Rewarding coercion, setting a dangerous precedent.

¹² Bajo, A.F. and News, G.I. (2026) DFA’s Lazaro: Monthly Meetings to be held for talks on SCS Code of conduct, GMA News Online. Available at: https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/974649/dfa-s-lazaro-monthly-meetings-to-be-held-for-talks-on-scs-code-of-conduct/story/ (Accessed: 05 March 2026).

¹³ Ordaniel, J. (2026) China’s RoRe deal: Rewarding coercion, setting a dangerous precedent.